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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Conflict of Laws-Insurance--Service of Process.
Action was instituted by plaintiff, a citizen and resident of Missis-
sippi, upon a default judgment rendered by a County Court of the
State of Mississippi upon a policy of insurance issued as a result of the
solicitation of defendant's Mississippi agent, defendant being a North
Carolina corporation. It appeared from the Mississippi judgment that
at the time of the institution of the action in the courts of Mississippi,
defendant company was no longer doing business there and process was
served on it by service on the Insurance Commissioner under a
Mississippi statute requiring foreign insurance companies to appoint
the Insurance Commissioner as their attorney to accept service so long
as any liability of the company remained outstanding in the state.
Summons was also served on the resident agent who had represented
defendant company at the time the policy was issued. Defendant con-
tends that the Mississippi Court did not have jurisdiction because it was
not doing business in the State and had not appointed the Insurance
Commissioner its attorney to accept service. Held, for plaintiff. Defend-
ant was estopped to set up its noncompliance with the statute and it
was conclusively presumed to have complied with such statute.'
Under the well settled rule that a state has the power to exclude,
restrict or regulate foreign corporations, doing or seeking to do business
within its borders,2 statutes have been passed requiring the corporation
before doing business in the state to have an agent in the state upon
whom service of process may be had.3 More particularly, foreign insur-
ance companies, which may be regulated under the police power,
4 must
designate some statutory agent such as the Insurance Commissioner to
accept service of process. 5 These statutes have been held valid6 and
I Dansby v. N. C. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 211 N. C. 120, 189 S. E. 122 (1937).
See also 209 N. C. 127, 183 S. E. 521 (1936).
2 Paul v. Virginia, 75 U. S. 168, 19 L. ed. 357 (1869) ; State of Wash. ex. rel.
Bond and Goodwin and Tucker, Inc. v. Superior Court of Wash. for Spokane
County, 289 U. S. 361, 53 Sup. Ct. 624, 77 L. ed. 1256 (1932); Northwestern
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wis., 247 U. S. 132, 38 Sup. Ct. 444, 62 L. ed. 1025 (1917)
(The business of insurance, as ordinarily conducted, is not interstate commerce,
and a state may absolutely exclude a foreign insurance company from doing
business within the state or may permit it to come within the state under such
restraints and regulations as the state may choose.) ; Fisher v. Trader's Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 136 N. C. 217, 48 S. E. 667 (1904); Lunceford v. Commercial
Travelers' Mut. Acc. Ass'n of America, 190 N. C. 314, 129 S. E. 805 (1935);
17 FLETcHER, PRIVATE CooRPORAIONS (Penn. ed., 1933) §§8386, n. 5, 8416, n. 3
(cases collected).
'18 FL.wcHER, PRIVATE CoRPoRATIO s (Perm. ed. 1933) §8697 (statutes collected
under footnote 54). As to jurisdiction of partnerships see Flexner v. Farson,
248 U. S. 289, 39 Sup. Ct. 97, 63 L. ed. 250 (1918).
'German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389, 34 Sup. Ct. 612, 58 L. ed.
1011 (1914) (Insurance business clothed with public interest and may be reg-
ulated under state's police power.); La Tourette v. McMasters, Ins. Comm'r,
248 U. S. 465, 39 Sup. Ct. 160, 63 L. ed. 362 (1919).
'Mississmi CODE ANN. §5165(3); N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §6411.
'Mut. Reserve Fund Life Ass'n v. Phelps, 190 U. S. 147, 23 Sup. Ct. 707, 47
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are said to become part of insurance policies.1 The limitations, condi-
tions, restrictions and burdens imposed by these statutes must of course
not infringe upon the rights accorded by the provisions of the Federal
or State Constitutions.8 In some types of situations the above men-
tioned statutes must, to be constitutional, require that the agent give the
foreign corporation notice of the service of process upon him.0 There
is a difference of opinion as to the effect of the failure of a foreign
corporation to appoint a designated state official its agent to receive
service of process.1 ° The most logical rule is found in those cases hold-
ing that when a foreign insurance corporation does business in a state
but fails to comply with the statute requiring the appointment of a
designated state official as its process agent, the corporation will never-
theless be bound by such service for all causes of action arising out of
business transacted within the state;" as in the principal case, but not
L. ed. 987 (1903); Biggs v. Mut. Reserve Fund Ass'n. 128 N. C. 5, 37 S. E. 955
(1901) ; Moore v. Mut. Reserve Fund Ass'n, 129 N. C. 31, 39 S. E. 637 (1901) ;
Mut. Reserve Fund Ass'n v. Scott, 136 N. C. 157, 48 S. E. 581 (1904) ; 18
FIETcHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (Perm. ed. 1933) §8762, n. 97.
'Collier v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 119 Fed. 617 (D. C. Mass.,
1902); Am. Loan and Investment Co. v. Boraas, 156 Minn. 431, 195 N. W. 271
(1923) ; Woodward v. Mut. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 178 N. Y. 485, 71 N. E. 10
(1904).
'Barron v. Burnside, 121 U. S. 186, 7 Sup. Ct. 931, 30 L. ed. 915 (1887) ; Horn
Silver Mining Co. v. N. Y., 143 U. S. 305, 12 Sup. Ct. 403, 36 L. ed. 164 (1891)
(state cannot interfere with interstate or foreign commerce) ; So. Pacific v. Den-
ton, 146 U. S. 202, 207, 13 Sup. Ct. 44, 36 L. ed. 915 (1887) ; Hooper v. California,
155 U. S. 648, 15 Sup. Ct. 207, 39 L. ed. 297 (1895) ; (Thus a corporation can-
not be deprived of the right to enter a state and transact business therein, when
it has derived its existence from an Act of Congress, and is a lawful agency for
the performance of governmental or quasi-governmental functions.); Liggett v.
Baldridge, 278 U. S. 105, 49 Sup. Ct. 57, 73 L. ed. 204 (1928) ; Lacy v. Armour
Packing Co., 134 N. C. 567, 47 S. E. 53 (1904), aff'd, 200 U. S. 226, 26 Sup. Ct. 232,
50 L. ed. 451 (1905); State v. Agcy, 171 N. C. 831, 88 S. E. 726 (1916) ; Brust
v. First National Bank of Stevens Point, 184 Wis. 15, 198 N. W. 749 (1924) (Nat.
bank cannot be excluded) ; 17 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (Perm. ed. 1933)
§8390, n. 32. (cases collected).
'State of Wash. ex rel. Bond and Goodwin and Tucker v. Superior Ct. of
Wash. for Spokane County, 289 U. S. 361, 53 Sup. Ct. 624, 77 L. ed. 1256, 89
A. L. R. 658 (1933) (Statute not invalid for failure to require state official to
give foreign corporation notice of service on him since foreign corporation could
have appointed its own agent.) ; Consolidated Flour Mills Co. v. Muegge, 278 U. S.
559, 49 Sup. Ct. 17, 73 L. ed. 505 (1928) (Where a foreign corporation has done
business within the state in defiance of statutory conditions and then withdrawn,
it may be brought into court by service on a state officer only if the statute im-
poses a duty to notify.) ; Note (1933) 89 A. L. R. 658 (review of holdings).
" Rothrock v. Dwelling House Ins., 161 Mass. 423, 37 N. E. 206, 23 L. R. A.
863 (1894) (service on state official whom the statute requires to be designated
but who has not in fact been designated held insufficient to confer jurisdiction to
render judgment against the corporation); Mason's Frat. Acc. Ass'n v. Riley,
60 Ark. 578, 31 S. W. 148 (1895).
' Funk v. Anglo-Am. Ins. Co., 27 Fed. 336 (C. C. E. D. Mo., 1886) ; Knapp,
Stout and Co. v. Nat. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 30 Fed. 607 (C. C. E. D. Mo., 1887);
Sparks v. Nat. Masonic Acc. Ass'n, 100 Iowa 458, 69 N. W. 678 (1896) ; Kulberg
v. Frat. Union of Am., 131 Minn. 131, 154 N. W. 748 (1915) ; Braunstein v. Frat.
Union of Am., 133 Minn. 8, 157 N. W. 721 (1916); Richardson Machinery v.
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as to business transacted out of the state.12 This rule is based on the
theory that by doing business in the state the corporation is said to have
consented to jurisdiction,1 3 such consent being presumed ;14 or on the
theory that the corporation is estopped to set up its violation of the
statute.15 The consent that is said to be implied in such cases is of
course a mere fiction, justified by the accepted doctrine that the state
could exclude the foreign corporation altogether, and could, therefore,
establish this obligation as a condition to its admission to the state.16
By the great weight of authority under statutes similar to those
under discussion, the withdrawal of the corporation from the state
does not revoke the authority of the agent to receive service in an
action arising in the state out of business done by the corporation
therein 17 as the appointment of a state official is a power coupled with
an interest and, therefore, irrevocable.' 8 If this were not true the
corporation would be able to avoid jurisdiction and thus place a great
hardship upon those who had dealt with it. As was expressed in one
case, "the end sought to be attained [protection of those dealing with
the foreign corporation by providing statutory agent for receiving
service] would be as illusory as a will o' the wisp, which fleets when it
is sought to grasp it."'1 In addition to service upon a designated state
Scott, 122 Okla. 125, 251 Pac. 482 (1926) ; Conques v. La. Western Ry., 295 S. W.
935 (Tex. 1937).
Old Wayne Mut. Life Ass'n of Indianapolis v. McDonough, 208 U. S. 8, 28
Sup. Ct. 201, 52 L. ed. 369 (1907).
Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How. 404, 15 L. ed. 451 (1855).
14Knapp, Stout and Co. v. Nat. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 30 Fed. 607 (C. C. E. D.
Mo., 1887) (service prima facie good); Flinn v. Western Mut Life Ass'n, 187
Iowa 507, 171 N. W. 711 (1919) (conclusive presumption).
"2North Am. Union v. Oliphant, 141 Ark. 346, 217 S. W. 1 (1919) ; Erhman
v. Teutonia Ins. Co., 1 Fed. 471 (1880) (The receipt of the premium and execu-
tion and delivery of the policy 'by the company are equivalent to an assertion that
it has complied with the requirements of the statute to entitle it to do business
in the state, and, as between the assured and the company, the latter is estopped
upon the soundest principles of the law and morals to say that it has not done
so.) ; Fisher v. Traders' Mut. Life Ins. Co., 136 N. C. 217, 48 S. E. 667 (1904)
17 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (Perm. ed. 1933) §8520, n. 36.
"Lafayette Ins. Co., v. French, 18 How. 404, 15 L. ed. 451 (1855).
' Woodward v. Mut. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 178 N. Y. 485, 71 N. E. 10 (1904);
Biggs v. Mut. Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 128 N. C. 5, 37 S. E. 955 (1901)
Hinton v. Mut. Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 135 N. C. 314, 47 S. E. 474 (1904);
RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws (1934) §93; Note (1926) 45 A. L. R. 1447;
18 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (Perm. ed. 1933) §8762 (excellent treat-
ment of the problem).
"Moore v. Mut. Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 129 N. C. 31, 39 S. E. 637 (1901)
(Exception to general rule that agency may be revoked recognized in that agency
irrevocable when coupled with an interest, or where it is contractual in its na-
ture, given for a consideration and for the protection of someone, or some in-
terest.) ; Frazier v. Steel and Tube Co. of America, 101 W. Va. 327, 132 S. E.
723 (1926). The objective seems to be to give the insured a feeling of security
as to an adequate remedy on his policy.
" Biggs y. Mut. Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 128 N. C. 6, 7, 37 S. E. 955, 956
(1901).
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official, the former agent of the company which has withdrawn may be
served with process so as to bind the foreign corporation, where the
matter in controversy arose out of business transacted in the state by
the corporation prior to its withdrawal.2 0 This is to prevent the mis-
carriage of justice through efforts of the corporation to withdraw and
thus avoid jurisdiction.
21
North Carolina requires of foreign insurance companies as a condi-
tion precedent 22 to doing business in the state that they give the
Insurance Commissioner an irrevocable power of attorney so long as
any liability of the company remains outstanding in the state.
23 If this
requirement is not complied with, service may be had as in the case of
other corporations.
2 4
The full faith and credit provision of the Constitution does not
prevent an inquiry into the jurisdiction of the court by which a judg-
ment offered in evidence was rendered. 25 By the weight of authority,
however, the foreign judgment is conclusive on collateral attack except
for want of jurisdiction or fraud.2 6 As to judgments rendered by the
courts not of record of another state the earlier cases held that such
judgments were not conclusive on the merits, 27 but it is now generally
settled that such judgments, when properly proved and when jurisdic-
tion is shown to have existed, are entitled to full faith and credit in
other states, and are as conclusive as the judgments of a court of
record.
28
Mut. Reserve Fund Life Ass'n v. Phelps, 190 U. S. 147, 23 Sup. Ct. 707.
47 L. ed. 987 (1903); Fisher v. Traders' Mut. Life Ass'n, 136 N. C. 217, 48
S. E. 667 (1904) ; FLETCHER, PIVATE CORPORArONS (Pern. ed. 1933) §8761. n. 67.
2 Brown-Ketchan Iron Works v. Swift Co., 53 Ind. A. 630, 100 N. E. 584
(1913).
2 Biggs v. Mut. Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 128 N. C. 5, 37 S. E. 955 (1901).
2 Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n v. Scott, 136 N. C. 157, 48 S. E. 581
(1904); N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935)§6411.
' Hinton v. Mut. Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 135 N. C. 314, 47 S. E. 474, 65
L. R. A. 161 (1904); Fisher v. Traders' Mut. Life Ins. Co., 136 N. C. 217, 48
S. E. 667 (1904); Brenzier v. Supreme Council, Royal Arcanum, 141 N. C. 409.
53 S. E. &35, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 235 (1906) ; Pardue v. Asher, 174 N. C. 676, 94
S. E. 414 (1917) ; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935)§§483, 1137 (service on for-
eign corporations).
'Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457, 21 L. ed. 897 (1873). To the same ef-
fect: Mottu v. Davis, 151 N. C. 237, 65 S. E. 969 (1909).
'Lewis v. United Order of Good Samaritans, 182 Ark. 914, 33 S. W. (2d) 53
(1930).
'Wood v. Wood, 78 Ky. 624 (1880); Warren v. Flagg, 2 Pick. 448 (Mass.
1824).
'Helton v. Turner, 153 So. 866 (Ala. 1934) (In action on a judgment on note
rendered by Tenn. justice of the peace court, the courts of Ala. are bound to
presume that the Tenn. court legally possessed jurisdiction over the subject mat-
ter upon which it professed to adjudicate, until the contrary is made to appear.) ;
Glass v. Blackwell, 48 Ark. 50, 2 S. W. 257 (1886); Banister v. Campbell, 138
Cal. 455, 71 Pac. 504 (1903) ; Baltimore and Ohio Ry. v. Freeze, 169 nd. 370, 82
N. E. 76 (1906); Matter of Curtis, 134 App. Div. 547, 119 N. Y. Supp. 556(1909), aff'd 197 N. Y. 583, 91 N. E. 1111 (1910).
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Some courts say that all facts essential to jurisdiction must appear
on the face of the record or be shown by competent evidence before the
adjudication can be accepted as binding and conclusive. 29 Other courts
go so far as to hold that foreign judgments may be attacked for want
of jurisdiction, even though jurisdictional facts are recited therein.30
In determining the question of jurisdiction of the parties in the foreign
judgment, courts have made use of certain presumptions 31 which are
relied upon only in the absence of evidence or averments respecting the
facts presumed.32 Such presumption of jurisdiction may be either
rebuttable 3 or conclusive.34 In the absence of a presumption the
burden of proving want of jurisdiction is on the defendant pleading
it.35 If the record of the judgment shows on its face that the court
rendering it did not have jurisdiction, the judgment will not be recog-
nized by the courts of other states.3 6 Neither will there be a presump-
tion of jurisdiction if the judgment is in proceedings which are special
and statutory and not according to the course of the common law.3
Once the jurisdiction of the subject matter of the suit and the person
of the defendant are obtained, it will be presumed that jurisdiction
continued to the judgment in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
38
It has been held that a direct adjudication by the courts of one state
21 Galpin v. Page, 18 Wall. 350, 21 L. ed. 959 (1873) ; Helton v. Turner, 153
So. 866 (Ala. 1934) ; Toler v. Coover, 335 Mo. 113, 71 S. W. (2d) 1067 (1934);
Fox Vilet Drug Co. v. Arnold, 84 S. W. (2d) 1012 (Tex. 1935).
Chicago Life Ins. Co. v. Cherry, 244 U. S. 25, 37 Sup. Ct. 492, 61 L. ed. 966
(1917) ; Drummond v. Lynch, 82 F. (2d) 806 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936) ; Dyke v. Ill.
Commercial Men's Ass'n, 358 Ill. 458, 193 N. E. 490 (1935); Mottu v. Davis,
151 N. C. 237, 65 S. E. 969 (1909); Bonnett-Brown Corp. v. Coble, 195 N. C.
491, 142 S. E. 772 (1928) ; Fisher v. March, 26 Grat 765 (Va. 1875).
' Monarch Refrigerating Co. v. Farmers' Peanut Co., 74 F. (2d) 790 (C. C. A.,
4th, 1935).
n Galpin v. Page, 18 Wall. 350, 21 L. ed.,.959 (1873).
' McAlister v. McAlister, 214 Ala. 345, 107 So. 843 (1926) (jurisdiction
prima facie in absence of showing on face of properly certified transcript of want
of jurisdiction) ; Makorios v. Green Co., 256 Mass. 598, 153 N. E. 11 (1926).
'Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen v. Agnew, 170 Miss. 615, 155 So. 205 (1934)
(Unless the contrary appears from the record, all jurisdictional facts are con-
clusively presumed to have existed, whether there be recitals in the record to
show them or not, and this rule applies, although the judgment attacked was
rendered by default, or constructive service of process alleged to be defective.
Presumption conclusive on collateral attack; and on direct attack, the defendant
must affirmatively show that the defect existed as a matter of fact.). But cf.
Woodville v. Pizzati, 119 Miss. 442, 81 So. 127 (1925) (the jurisdiction of the
court of the first instance over the parties and subject matter must affirmatively
appear).
" Monarch Refrigerating Co. v. Farmers' Peanut Co., 74 F. (2d) 790 (C. C. A.
4th, 1935); Miller v. Brown, 170 Ark. 949, 281 S. W. 904 (1926); Rodenbeck
v. Crews State Bank and Trust Co., 97 Ind. App. 21, 163 N. E. 616 (1928).
'Holland v. Universal Life Co., 180 AtI 328 (Del. 1935); Old Wayne Mut.
Life Ass'n v. Flynn, 31 Ind. App. 473, 68 N. E. 327 (1903) ; Smith v. Central
Trust Co., 154 N. Y. 333, 48 N. E. 553 (1897).
" Holland v. Universal Life Co., 180 Adt. 328 (Del. 1935) (substituted service
statute involved).01 Laing v. Rigney, 160 U. S. 531, 16 Sup. Ct 366, 40 L. ed. 525 (1896).
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that the court which rendered a certain judgment had the requisite
authority and that the parties were legally brought before the court is
conclusive on the question and is not open to collateral attack.39 Mere
irregularities cannot be set up against the judgment when brought in
question in another state4 0 but it is well settled that the defense may be
interposed that the judgment was obtained by fraud.4 '
The principal case follows the weight of authority. The defendant
not having shown lack of jurisdiction or fraud in the procurement of
the judgment could not overturn it. Defendant was estopped to show
lack of jurisdiction by setting up its own violation of the statute requir-
ing it to designate the Insurance Commissioner as its attorney to accept
service.
J. D. MALLONEE, JR.
Constitutional Law-Local Laws-Regulation of Professions-
Real Estate Brokers.
In 1868 the General Assembly of North Carolina was given consti-
tutional power to tax trades and professions.1 In 1899 the first license
tax was placed on real estate dealers. 2 A tax on this trade for the
purpose of raising revenue has continued to the present 3 and paying
this has been the only state-wide legal requirement for engaging in the
real estate business.
In 1927 an act 4 was passed which made the qualifications for
obtaining a license in eight counties depend upon the applicant's ability
to show to the satisfaction of a Real Estate Commission his reputation
for honesty and fair dealing and his competency to transact the business
in such a manner as to safeguard the public.5
This statute was held unconstitutional in State v. Warreno on the
ground that it was local in effect, applying to but eight counties, and
was thus discriminatory and in violation of the right to equal protection
of the laws. Had the act been applicable to the whole state, the majority
opinion implies that it would have been a valid use of the police power.
'Van Matre v. Sankey, 148 Ill. 536, 36 N. E. 628 (1893); Citizens' Nat.
Bank v. Consolidated Glass Co., 83 W. Va. 1, 97 S. E. 689 (1919).
'Drummond v. Lynch, 82 F. (2d) 806 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936).
" Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107, 10 Sup. Ct. 269, 33 L. ed. 538 (1890);
Jaster v. Currie, 198 U. S. 144, 25 Sup. Ct. 614, 49 L. ed. 998 (1904) ; Cannon v.
Howell, 131 N. C. 125, 42 S. E. 555 (1902); Levin v. Gladstein, 142 N. C. 448,
55 S. E. 371, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 905 (1906) ; Mottu v. Daniels, 151 N. C. 237,
65 S. E. 969 (1909) ; Roberts v. Pratt, 152 N. C. 731, 68 S. E. 240 (1910); Ring
and Wellborn v. Whitman, 194 N. C. 544. 140 S. E. 159 (1927); Bonnett-Brown
Corp. v. Coble, 195 X. C. 491, 142 S. E. 772 (1928).
2N. C. CoNST. art. V, §3. 2 P. L. N. C. 1899, c. 2, §50.
3 P. L. N. C. 1935, c. 371, §100. 'Public-Local Laws 1927, c. 241.
The act likewise provided eleven causes for which the license might be sus-
pended or revoked.
0211 N. C. 75, 189 S. E. 108 (1937).
